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This paper makes a theoretical innovation by integrating two key principles – mutual for-
bearance and the principle of congruity – into one general process model. It examines
the micro-mechanisms underlying the formation of a mutual-forbearance agreement and
explicates the role of time and of individual actions. We further understanding of the pro-
cess of cooperation building by drawing a parallel between early stages of the formation
process of mutual forbearance and cooperation, and argue that mutual forbearance may,
under certain conditions, lead to long-term cooperation or, if mismanaged, completely
smother any chances of it. A prospective agreement may be put at risk when potential
contributions are evaluated differently by each party and no action to mitigate the conse-
quences is taken; even more so in a mutual-forbearance context when the parties can only
observe their counterparts’ actions through the market. Our model takes into account the
micro-mechanisms associated with the time between the actions of one entity/individual
(e.g. the top manager) and the reaction of another entity/individual, the boundary condi-
tions of the background to those actions and the alternative actions available during this
time. Propositions for further exploration and implications are drawn.
Introduction
The critical issue in establishing and managing an
alliance is to create a structure that fosters trust
and builds confidence in the alliance, such that all
parties to the alliance bring their best efforts and
resources into the alliance. A successful alliance is
based on relationships that foster confidence in all
the contracting parties, so that all are willing to in-
vest in the alliance. The creation of relationships
based onmutual forbearance and on the congruity
of actions with other parties’ frame of reference
(the principle of congruity) is critical to the under-
standing of alliance formation and operation. This
conceptual paper presents a process model that
combines the concept of mutual forbearance with
the principle of congruity in the formation of a
A free video abstract to accompany this article can be
found online at: https://youtu.be/lGj0WNCcgXY
cooperative agreement such as a strategic alliance,
thus contributing to the cooperation literature.
Mutual forbearance is defined as the ‘situation
in which all parties forbear on a reciprocal basis’
(Bernheim andWhinston, 1990; Buckley and Cas-
son, 1988, p. 35). We develop a time-based model
for the evolution of mutual forbearance. Mutual
forbearance is not full cooperation (Danese, 2011;
Parkhe, 1993b, 1993c) as it relies on implicit or
indirect interactions (cf. Ames, Weber and Zou,
2012). Mutual forbearance may lead to coopera-
tion under certain conditions. It also diminishes
rivalry (Ryu, Reuer and Brush, 2020; Theeke and
Lee, 2017).
Mutual forbearance is a pre-cooperation mech-
anism. Prospective cooperation partners tend to
evaluate their own potential contributions to the
venture aswell as those of their partners differently
(Buckley, Cross and De Mattos, 2015; De Mattos
and Salciuviene, 2019; Stopford and Wells, 1972).
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When they take action towards the other party
based on their evaluations, cooperation may be
jeopardized. The mutual-forbearance process al-
lows the parties to maintain (as a minimum) a neu-
tral negotiation atmosphere, and progress towards
cooperation (Luo, 2001). In the context of in-
ternational cooperation, differences between cul-
tures may become a hindrance (Adair, Weingart
and Brett, 2007; Lee, Yang and Graham, 2006). A
breakdown of interactions is more likely between
parties fromdifferent cultures (Adler andGraham,
1989; Liu et al., 2012a; Shenkar, Luo andYeheskel,
2008). In interactions between two or more cul-
tures, the effectiveness of mutual forbearance lead-
ing towards inter-firm cooperation is influenced by
the amount of time needed for the consecutive acts
of forbearance to take place, and the perceived
equivalence (Ring and Vandeven, 1994) of acts of
forbearance. This study sheds light on these micro-
mechanisms, taking an individual or ‘topmanager’
perspective.
Mutual forbearance is used as a strategy by firms
targeting several markets concurrently, adopting
multi-market strategies (Gimeno, 1999; Golden
and Ma, 2003; Kocak and Ozcan, 2013). Mutual-
forbearance practices are an integral part of the
strategic portfolio of multinational corporations.
Cases of mutual forbearance have been identi-
fied across a number of sectors, including airlines
(Ciliberto andWilliams, 2014; Evans andKessides,
1994; Jayachandran, Gimeno and Varadarajan,
1999; Prince and Simon, 2009; Van Reeven and
Pennings, 2016; Yu, Subramaniam and Cannella,
2009), telecommunications (Parker and Roller,
1997), banking and financial markets (Baum,
Bowers andMohanram, 2016; Bowers et al., 2014;
Heggestad and Rhoades, 1978; Martinez, 1990)
and hotels (Fernandez and Marin, 1998; Ingram
and Baum, 1997; Kalnins, 2004). Mutual forbear-
ance has been examined through different theo-
retical lenses, including economics (Ciliberto and
Williams, 2014; Evans and Kessides, 1994), strat-
egy and competitive dynamics (Chen and Miller,
1994; Gimeno, 1999), marketing (Jayachandran,
Gimeno and Varadarajan, 1999; Kang, Bayus and
Balasubramanian, 2010; Shankar, 1999) and game
theory (Arend and Seale, 2005; Seale, Arend and
Phelan, 2006). Most studies are at the firm (Baum
and Korn, 1996, 1999) or industry/market level
(Feinberg, 1984), with few studies at the individual
or managerial level (Baum, Bowers and Mohan-
ram, 2016; Bowers et al., 2014). Although mutual
forbearance is a well-established phenomenon,
studies have not fully considered the micro-
mechanisms underlying mutual forbearance as an
antecedent of a cooperative venture-formation
process, nor have they considered what is known
about the micro-mechanisms of the cooperative
venture-formation process to explain mutual for-
bearance. Literature investigating the process of
mutual forbearance at the individual or top man-
ager level is scarce. Moreover, few studies of coop-
erative agreements are at the individual level. Most
work examines managerial characteristics, includ-
ing trust-related studies (Bhattacharya, Devinney
and Pillutla, 1998; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012;
Jones and George, 1998; Kim and Parkhe, 2009),
game theory studies (Rao and Schmidt, 1998) and
negotiation process studies (Chertkoff and Esser,
1976; Huffmeier et al., 2014; Lander andKooning,
2013; Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer, 1998).
The role of time in the formation process of
mutual-forbearance agreements has not been in-
vestigated. Studies on the role of time in the con-
text of collaborations have considered different
perspectives, for instance, at the firm level the influ-
ence of time (e.g. the firm’s age) in the cooperation
process (Fernández-Olmos and Ramírez-Alesón,
2017) or in building trust (Vanneste, Puranam and
Kretschmer, 2014). Studies at the individual level
have not examined the subjective and often cul-
turally based perceptions of time (Adair, Weingart
and Brett, 2007; Mosakowski and Earley, 2000),
nor the role of common individual characteris-
tics in strengthening interpersonal ties that foster
collaboration (Dahlander and McFarland, 2013).
Despite the importance assigned to mutual for-
bearance as a viable inter-firm strategy, little is
understood about the pre-formation stage of
mutual-forbearance agreements when the parties
take tactical steps, signals are interpreted and re-
active tactics emerge.
Past literature distinguishes two types of re-
search procedures in investigating processes. We
propose a third process type. The first type exam-
ines dynamic changes within variables and the sec-
ond type focuses on the progression of a sequence
of events over time towards an expected outcome
(Das andVan deVen, 2000; Langley, 1999;Monge,
1990; Van deVen andHuber, 1990; Van deVen and
Poole, 1995). The latter category offers a dynamic
perspective with due consideration to the succes-
sion of events, as well as the intensity and du-
ration of each (Das and Van de Ven, 2000). We
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examine sequential events but also consider the
time between events as a variable that may influ-
ence change in the subsequent event (or outcome
event) that occurs after an initial (or a causal) event
(Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). This time inter-
val parallels what Monge (1990) refers to as the
lag between the changes specified by causal and
outcome variables and is equivalent to the process
model proposed by Balakrishnan and Eliashberg
(1995) to describe a two-party negotiation with a
sequence of ‘offers and counter-offers’ (p. 226).
The third type is where a sequence of events over
time is examined concomitantly and considers the
time between events as a causal variable. In the case
of mutual forbearance, the time between one event
(inaction from one party) and another event (inac-
tion from the other party) may affect the outcome.
The process of mutual-forbearance formation de-
pends on interpretations regarding the actions (or
inactions)1 and the subsequent reactions of the
parties involved, which indicate the willingness of
either party to proceed in an expected way. These
interpretations, and the expectations thereof, are
assumed to be shared fully or partially by both par-
ties. These inactions and reactions are events that
occur over time, and their expected timing (or de-
lay) will influence the way the (in)actions are sub-
sequently interpreted.
Our process model characterizes the micro-
mechanisms of the formation process of mutual
forbearance in a novel perspective employing the
principle of congruity. This processmodel explains
the micro-dynamics of sequences of step actions
(as well as intended inactions) that individuals fol-
low while establishing an implicit understanding
based on mutual forbearance. Mutual forbearance
at the individual level is a cooperation-building
action or practice – an action that may lead to
cooperation. Individuals, or more specifically se-
nior managers, by engaging inmutual forbearance,
must make an effort to understand the mind-set of
the other party through market signals. The out-
come of this thought-intensive exercise, further ex-
posure to the other party’s behaviour and strength-
ened expectations around it, may lead to further
advances towards full cooperation. Rather than an
implicit or tacit collusion, which presupposes il-
legality, mutual forbearance is an expedient and
1The term ‘inactions’ is used from here onward. Purpose-
ful inactions consciously taken are termed managerial
decisions.
lawful strategic procedure attempting to increase
the feasibility of specific (and otherwise resource-
hungry) business initiatives. It may be a temporary
situation where parties attempt to understand the
objectives and strategies of each other through in-
direct interaction (cf. Ames,Weber and Zou, 2012)
so they may grasp insights of each other’s mind-
sets, behaviours and even values. We present the
concept of mutual forbearance as the formation of
a tacit dyadic collaborative agreement through the
lens of the principle of congruity ‘reverse causal-
ity’ (Buckley, Cross and De Mattos, 2015, p. 1050)
or the principle of congruity reversed. Whereas
the principle of congruity (Osgood and Tannen-
baum, 1955) depicts, in a broad sense, an actor’s
agreement with those that are perceived as sup-
porting his evaluations/arguments, the reverse in-
terpretation highlights the adjustments needed for
the principle to hold in cases where the ‘other’
(entity/individual) does not agree with the ac-
tor’s evaluations/arguments. In the latter case, con-
gruity will be achieved through the actor’s adjust-
ment of their frame of reference, which translates
into an attitude change towards the ‘other’ (source
of evaluations). We may illustrate the principle of
congruity reversed by modernizing the gist of Os-
good and Tannenbaum’s (1955) example for the
principle of congruity itself.2 While the principle
of congruity develops a positive evaluation of an
action from a positive attitude to the source or ac-
tor, the principle of congruity reversed develops a
negative attitude towards an actor or source due
to negatively evaluated actions. Similar ‘adjust-
ing’ behaviour has been noted within global strate-
gic alliances, including those in the telecommuni-
cations sectors (WorldPartners, Concert, Global
One, Unisource) (Oh, 1996), as well as car manu-
facturing (Burgers et al., 1993). The latter situation
highlights changes in the frame of reference of the
actors caused by different evaluations, rather than
emphasizing the behaviour of actors that similarly
evaluate objects or other actors (as in the principle
of congruity).
2In their paper, Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) use the
example of Pravda (a USSR newspaper) arguing for nu-
clear disarmament, and the negative effect the cold-war
US–USSR relations would have regarding this, which is
a neutral, if not positive, idea. A contemporary illustra-
tion for the principle of congruity reversed is the relatively
recent turnaround of China’s image, considering US per-
spectives on China in 2020 vis-à-vis 2015.
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Mutual forbearance
Mutual forbearance refers to a sequence of coun-
teracted forbearance acts. Considering a bilat-
eral interaction, one party’s act of forbearance
is counteracted by an act of forbearance from
another party. The notion of forbearance and,
by implication, mutual forbearance, generally re-
flects ‘patient self-control, restraint and tolerance’
or, in the legal context, ‘the action of refrain-
ing from exercising a legal right […]’ (Oxford En-
glish Dictionary). The idea of forbearance and mu-
tual forbearance is implicitly built upon expecta-
tions of future benefit, and should appeal ‘most
to those agents who take a long-term view of the
situation’ (Buckley and Casson, 1988, p. 34). A
real-world example concerns cooperation between
banks and insurance companies, where banks offer
(cross-sell) insurance products to their clients. The
benefits accrued by banks are less tangible and
connected to sustaining customers’ long-term sat-
isfaction, bringing a one-stop experience to reality
(Voutilainen, 2005). Definitions used in previous
studies have varied. Mutual forbearance as well as
forbearance relate to situations where actors re-
frain from acts that would be deemed logical or
even rightful given the circumstances. Forbearance
in legal studies refers to inaction (when some ac-
tionwas possible or expected) and its liability (con-
sequences) (Sarkowicz, 1980). Action is expected
based on existing law, regulation, norm or proce-
dure, prescribing the given conditions of the en-
vironment surrounding the event. The law is con-
cerned with the liability of the act that underwent
forbearance. In order to establish liability of such
(in)action, the norms regulating such an act and
its forbearance should be analysed. Thus, we can
establish a causal nexus between the antecedent
(conditional) and the consequent (outcome). Close
to mutual forbearance is the idea of reciprocity.3
Mutual forbearance, although based on the notion
of perceived equivalence, does not imply the same
level of obligation and confidence of one action
leading to an equivalent counter-action. Thus, mu-
tual forbearance is associated with greater uncer-
3Reciprocity emerges from the idea that ‘each party has
rights and duties’ (Gouldner, 1960, p. 169) relative to the
other party. It may be associated with an expectation
created by behavioural norms within the actor’s cultural
background, which may emphasize the obligation to re-
ciprocate (Emerson, 1976; Gouldner, 1960).
tainty than the notion of reciprocity, and it implies
an increased vulnerability of the parties involved
(cf. Malhotra, 2004). Moreover, while reciprocity
usually presumes an exchange of concrete benefits
directly between parties (Goldstein, Griskevicius
and Cialdini, 2011), mutual forbearance is based
on perceptions of an unsubstantiated likelihood of
a future fair exchange.4
4While reciprocity may be directly expressed for instance
by solidarity and exchange of information (Swärd, 2016),
a mutual-forbearance act cannot be expressed by any of
these, as there is no direct communication between par-
ties.Whenmutual forbearance is compared to generalized
reciprocity (Das and Teng, 2002; Wincent et al., 2010),
indirect reciprocity among three or more parties is more
likely for free-riding to take place. However, rather than
with generalized reciprocity where a free-riding stimulus
for instance may be due to the lack of information be-
tween acts of reciprocity between other parties, within
mutual forbearance a free-riding is more likely to be due
to a possible lack of perceived equivalence between in-
direct actions between the parties. Reciprocal actions be-
tween two parties imply a sequence of evaluations. A
party should evaluate the importance of an action from
the other party, then evaluate their possible actions, at-
tempting to ‘wear the other party’s shoes’ in choos-
ing what would be seen as an equivalent action. This
may be compared with the idea of heteromorphic reci-
procity or reciprocity imbalance (Gouldner, 1960), which
may occur within a generalized reciprocity setting –
where different actions or objects may be considered as
equivalent. The latter seem to be accepted as the rule
in business transactions in that unequal exchanges are
perceived as fair exchanges (Gouldner, 1960; Messick
and Sentis, 1979). Arguably, the universal behaviour that
permeates reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Malhotra, 2004)
refers to intention, although there remain questions about
the intensity of the intention or the timing of actions
that demonstrate the intention. Swärd (2016) emphasizes
that small goodwill-based reciprocal actions can develop
trust, including actions that are tangible, based, for in-
stance, on current norms in the industry (Swärd, 2016).
We argue that a similar outcome should be expected in the
case of mutual forbearance, but based on more intangible
actions and harder-to-discern intentions underlying this
action (where there is no direct communication between
parties). Mutual forbearance is particularly valuable in
uncertain conditions. In addition, one party must also
time its actions and evaluate the time necessary for the
other party to realize the intention behind such actions.
The latter may be associated with an expectation created
by behavioural norms within that actor’s cultural back-
ground, which emphasizes the obligation to reciprocate
(Gouldner, 1960). These steps are similar in the mutual-
forbearance process and are modelled in later sections of
the paper. A cyclic reinforcement of trust through reci-
procity is envisaged (Pillutla, Malhotra and Murnighan,
2003). A cycle presumes an expectation of repeated
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Examining mutual forbearance as a strategy
that may lead to cooperation, we suggest that the
formation of long-term successful collaboration
depends on internal support for the deal (For-
nell, Lorange and Roos, 1990) and on what hap-
pens during the face-to-face interactive process
that precedes it. It also depends on the expecta-
tions of both organizations, represented by their
senior managements’ ‘mind-set’ (Chua andWood-
ward, 1993). Because this process usually involves
decision-making at the individual (top manager)
or team (senior management team) level, two is-
sues are relevant.
1. In the context of the formation of mutual for-
bearance, how do senior managers or teams
evaluate the intentions of competitors in or-
der to foster long-term mutually beneficial out-
comes, and act accordingly, while considering
also the market actions of such competitors,
and avoiding opportunistic behaviour?
2. What can individuals taking part in interac-
tions leading to a mutual-forbearance process
do to maximize the chances of building endur-
ing business relationships?
The research on attitude formation and com-
munications focus has been on senior managers’
characteristics and their link to performance (Du-
ane, 1983; Escribá-Esteve, Sánchez-Peinado and
Sánchez-Peinado, 2009; Hambrick, 2007). This
emphasizes inherited or learned characteristics
and skills that are static at a given point in time,
rather than the dynamics of the interaction pro-
cess. In any such deal, there is the risk of non-
reciprocity. It is not clear what thresholds and deci-
sion criteria are considered under such ambiguous
conditions.
The development of this model focuses on the
moderating role of mutual forbearance, counter-
ing the tendency determined by the principle of
congruity. Mutual forbearance appears to be con-
trary to the principle of congruity because it either
delays or rescinds expected reactions predicted by
that principle. It supports the decision-makers’ fo-
cus on the long-term potential of a strong re-
lationship rather than fostering the impulse to
interactions (Malhotra, 2004). In cross-cultural interac-
tions, mutual forbearance influences the timing and in-
tensity of (in)actions in a similar way as observed with
reciprocity in the telecommunication sector (Kashlak
et al., 1998).
follow the congruity principle and its ensuing fo-
cus on short-term gain. Practices and expectations
regarding the duration of actions and reactions
of one party may be perceived as an indication
of (un)willingness or (non)commitment from the
other parties involved.
Considering only an inter-organizational con-
text, mutual forbearance refers to situations where
one firm refrains from taking an aggressive ap-
proach against a competitor firm in one market
and, due to such (in)action, receives reciprocally
similar treatment in another market (Bernheim
and Whinston, 1990; Haveman and Nonnemaker,
2000; Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985; Prince and
Simon, 2009).5 This mechanism is central to an
informal cooperative agreement, although rather
than engaging on joint action, the parties recip-
rocally refrain from actions that would other-
wise be expected to harm the other party. Mu-
tual forbearance differs from collusion in that,
regarding the former, strategic actions and reac-
tions are based on opaque signals drawn indirectly
from the product market, whereas the latter pre-
supposes direct communication between the firms
involved.
Inter-firm interaction may assume three modes:
aggressive, neutral (Buckley and Casson, 1988)
and cooperative or integrative (Moran and Ritov,
2007). Aggressive interactions take place when the
actors pursue their own objectives without con-
cern for the implications of their actions for oth-
ers. In neutral interactions, actors willingly re-
frain from acts that would either disadvantage
or give advantage to others (Buckley and Cas-
son, 1988). In cooperative or integrative mode, ac-
tors seek to facilitate others to achieve their ob-
jective, even when little or no benefit to them-
selves is envisaged. Our general model may be
used with firms as actors, and these ‘actors’ (or
firms) may be associated with different behaviour
towards other actors (or firms) in their operating
environment.Mutual forbearancemay be included
as part of their portfolio of integrative actions or
behaviour.
Thus far, mutual forbearance has been treated
without attention to its formation process (e.g.
5Because the notion of refraining from an action is
linked intrinsically to the existence of the option to act,
past studies have investigated forbearance-related con-
cepts such as power while adding indirectly to the under-
standing of inter-firm actions (Feinberg, 1985).
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Anand, Mesquita and Vassolo, 2009; Baum and
Korn, 1999). Yet such agreements in a business
context depend ultimately on how managers inter-
pret the actions of competitors and act or react
to such actions (Gimeno, 1999). Mutual forbear-
ance may be seen as the result of individual ac-
tions over time, bearing in mind the influence of
a number of moderators. Decisions taken at the
individual level (e.g. senior manager’s interpreta-
tion of the market implications of the strategic
moves of another firm) will impact mutual for-
bearance acting at the firm level. Considering time
and interactions at the individual level (including
non-observable interactions), viewed through the
principle of congruity, allows both positive and
negative behaviour of firms in a business context
to be better understood in the light of moderating
factors such as individual-level different cultural
and mind-set influences. Improved understanding
of the micro-dynamics of this process leads to the
avoidance of impulsive (re)actions that initiate or
escalate conflict, paving the way for more fruitful
relationships.
Mutual forbearance has been investigated in
several knowledge domains and at three levels of
analysis (market, firm, and individual level).6 The
extant literature on mutual forbearance, its micro-
dynamics and influence on behaviour at the in-
dividual level is scarce. At this level of analysis,
we look at mutual forbearance in the context of
interactions between individuals, and how man-
agers behave under conditions preceding amutual-
forbearance agreement. Considering a broader
perspective, a number of forbearance-related stud-
ies occur in business-related subfields, including
psychology (McCullough, Fincham and Tsang,
2003; Milgram, Stern and Levin, 2006). These ob-
serve situations where actors refrain from taking
action against others; action that would otherwise
take place following customary behaviours such
as a ‘tit for tat’ approach (Axelrod, 1990; Mil-
gram, Stern and Levin, 2006). At the team and in-
dividual level, we observe decision-makers’ strate-
gic behaviour arising from socially constructed
scenarios and influencing notions of ‘value and
merit’ (Ailon, 2008; Calás, 1993; Calas and Smir-
6The literature on mutual forbearance has usually fo-
cused on the level of the firm (Buckley and Casson, 1988;
Golden and Ma, 2003; Phillips and Mason, 1992; Yu
et al., 2009) and the market level – the latter usually as-
sociated with studies of competitive behaviour.
cich, 1999; Cooper, 1989), which in turn portray
the problems at hand and their implications. Such
circumstantial conditions and contextual under-
standing cannot be unbiased (Ailon, 2008) and
may generate various ‘truths’ or interpretations of
reality (Manning and Cullum-Swan, 1994). The
general concept of mutual forbearance is impor-
tant because it is a major theoretical underpinning
for the way the process of a type of cooperation
is developed through the impact of individual ac-
tions and reactions over time.
Cooperation in general and business cooper-
ative agreements has been investigated at vari-
ous levels and theoretical perspectives (Beamish
and Killing, 1997; Kim and Parkhe, 2009; Parkhe,
1993a). Studies have attempted to clarify questions
such as ‘what are the determinants of a successful
business cooperation?’ or ‘what is the best partner
in a given situation constrained by particular cir-
cumstances?’, usually focusing on the firm level.
The formation and use of joint-venture strate-
gies has been investigated since the 1970s (Stop-
ford and Wells, 1972). A number of theoretical
models explain cooperative ventures (Beamish and
Banks, 1987; Buckley and Casson, 1997; Geringer
and Hebert, 1989; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004;
Parkhe, 1993c). Investigations of cooperation for-
mation at the individual level have been more lim-
ited, in spite of the anecdotal evidence suggesting
that few CEOs excel in fostering such agreements.
An example is CarlosGhosnwho brought together
Nissan and Renault (Stoll, 2017), but this ended in
tragedy.
The process of cooperation forming depends on
the actions and reactions of individuals through
their business decisions, which in turn are based on
expectations and perceptions of the importance of
objects of negotiation. This defines what is a ‘fair’
deal (Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982).
Although current models often portray the egois-
tic behaviour of individuals, individuals may hold
collectivist views and behave accordingly (Wag-
ner III, 1995), eroding the validity of the usual
assumptions. Thus, contrary to the business and
economics literature, which emphasizes individ-
ual and rational thinking in the pursuit of unful-
filled needs, cooperation is a more complex phe-
nomenon and its understanding requires broader
theoretical perspectives. For instance, drawing
from evolutionary biology, we see cooperation as
a human characteristic that is a vital component
of the instinct for survival (Sterelny et al., 2013).
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Cooperation is associated with widespread bene-
fit, resulting in a sustainable/stable situation. The
latter, in conjunction with the exploration of mul-
tiple markets by two or more firms, could be
seen as a desirable and fair situation to protect
firms’ resources. Here, actions entail a harmonious
path (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), and embody
fairness.
The formation or maintenance of a cooperative
climate is predicated by the facility of objective
communication (Bottom et al., 2006; Ertel, 1999;
Tencati and Zsolnai, 2009), which often depends
on subjective attitudes such as expectations, as-
sumptions, and attitudes, based on past experience
or information. The classic prisoner’s dilemma
game result is that both parties could be rela-
tively better off if they cooperate, as compared
to a non-cooperative stance (Axelrod, 1990), al-
though a rational decision-maker would choose
non-cooperation as the less risky alternative. In
other words, when communication is curtailed,
the benefit of cooperation is less effective than the
threats imposed by individual behaviour.
The principle of (in)congruity
We use the principle of congruity (Osgood and
Tannenbaum, 1955) to give theoretical structure
to our analysis of cooperative ventures.7 This sug-
gests that the evaluation by an individual of an
object related to another individual and their sub-
sequent attitude change tends to strengthen con-
gruity with the individual’s existing frame of ref-
erence (Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955), which
includes previous evaluations of sources related
to the object. The principle of congruity, in the
context of a message between two parties, pre-
dicts an individual’s attitude change, taking into
consideration the evaluation of both the content
and the source of the message. In a two-party
collaborative deal-negotiation setting, the attitude
of one party regarding the contribution of the
7Although this principle has been explored in other
contexts (Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Fatas-Villafranca
et al., 2011; Gross and Wiedmann, 2015; Olshavsky and
Miller, 1972; Perkins and Forehand, 2012; Salciuviene
et al., 2010; Shapiro, 1969; Styvén et al., 2020; Zhang,
2010), including international business and management
studies (Buckley et al., 2015; Vohra and Davies, 2020;
Walsh et al., 2014), it has had limited application to in-
ternational collaboration.
other party towards the prospective deal should
consider the benefit associated with the contribu-
tion, but also the existing status of the proponent
against the first party’s frame of reference. This
means that an individual may provide a higher val-
uation of an object because someone they hold
in high esteem has highly valued it. The role of
expectations in this process should be stressed.
During a dyadic interaction process, an individ-
ual will consider their expectations regarding not
only the focal object and the other party, but also
their expectations regarding the other party’s atti-
tude or heightened valuation of the focal object.
The effect of heightened managerial expectations
arising from current or previous alternative busi-
ness decisions on expectations has been investi-
gated with the use of simulations (Malhotra and
Gino, 2011). These ideas link to themicro-dynamic
process leading to mutual forbearance, because at
each step options are valued based on expecta-
tions generated by tactical moves as well as on past
and present constraints and experiences. The level
of analysis of this study is the decision-maker8 –
either the individual (e.g. senior manager) or the
team – and therefore it is appropriate to drawn on
social psychology theories such as the principle of
congruity for theorizing. Social psychology’s basic
tenets (Bales, 1950) will affect decision-making in
our context. For instance: (a) decisions by individ-
uals or teams are based on interactions including
with the self, with others as well as with objects;
(b) these interaction are either overt (observable)
or covert (non-observable) (Bales, 1950); (c) deci-
sions are drawn on individual cognitive patterns
(Marcel, Barr and Duhaime, 2011); (d) individuals
(or teams)may assess the ‘value’ of objects, actions
or statements, and other individuals; (e) teams of
individuals will have an internal dynamic during
the decision-making process dependent on team
characteristics regarding the strength and kind of
ties among the members of the team (McPher-
son, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001). In the context
of a dyadic asymmetric interaction, unfounded
optimism regarding expected gains may result in
above-average risk-taking (Anderson and Galin-
sky, 2006; Fast et al., 2009, 2012) or be negatively
influenced by prior cooperation (Uribe, Sytch and
Kim, 2019). This effect may be based on positive
8The implicit assumption here is that mutual forbearance
is a vital strategic move and will reflect closely the mind-
set of the firm’s senior leadership (e.g. the CEO or SMT).
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impressions developed in the short term, by a
positive created atmosphere during a negotia-
tion session, or by long-term attitudes and ex-
pectations (Chung, Sternquist and Chen, 2006;
Jap, Robertson and Hamilton, 2011; Srivastava
and Chakravarti, 2009). Expectations of what the
other party’s next actions may be are linked to the
individual’s frame of reference through more ob-
jective historical information, as well as more sub-
jective valuations developed during the dynamic
interaction process.
General model – the interaction of
mutual forbearance and the principle of
congruity
We begin with a simple application of the principle
of congruity to the case of a two-partner alliance
and possible mutual-forbearance (or forbearance)
situations. Then, we generate a model of mutual
forbearance in the context of a two-party coop-
erative agreement formation emphasizing the ef-
fect of mutual forbearance contrary to the behav-
ior suggested by the principle of congruity. Finally,
we theorize on the role of time in the mechanisms
underlying mutual-forbearance formation.
Application of the principle of congruity to the
case of forbearance between two prospective
alliance partners
We draw on the principle of congruity reversed ap-
plied to the case of a two-partner alliance (Buck-
ley, Cross andDeMattos, 2015). Here, one partner
P1 changes their attitude towards the other part-
ner P2 in order to maintain the congruity between
P2’s expressed disagreement with P1’s evaluation
regarding the prospective contribution of P1 to the
alliance (C1,1), thus following the principle of con-
gruity. In this case, the disagreement regarding the
evaluation of an object generates a negative atti-
tude between the partners.
A second alternative is when P2 forbears, or
specifically refrains from expressing their opin-
ion/evaluation regarding C1,1. In the absence of
an incongruent attitude from P2 (Figure 1a), P1
makes an assumption of agreement and therefore
will not change their attitude towards P2, which re-
mains neutral. Thus, P1 assumes a positive or neu-
tral attitude (to keep congruity with the initial neu-
tral attitude) as depicted in Figure 2(b). P2, aware
of the possible negative consequences of the in-
congruence, refrains from taking action in order
to maintain a positive atmosphere.
A third alternative is that P1 refrains from im-
pulsively following the congruity principle (after
a negative evaluation of P2) and by so doing for-
bears from an action that could jeopardize the
good atmosphere. This situation is illustrated in
Figure 2(b). Although P2 has expressed an incon-
gruent evaluation, P1 refrains from any impulsive
action (which would follow the principle of con-
gruity), allowing the positive (or neutral) atmo-
sphere to remain and thus achieving mutual for-
bearance.
The impact of mutual forbearance on dyadic
alliance negotiations
We model the effects of mutual forbearance vis-à-
vis the principle of congruity during a two-party
alliance negotiation. Our model demonstrates the
effect of the parties’ disposition to refrain from ac-
tions that would lead to conflict during a two-party
cooperative business negotiation, as predicted by
the principle of congruity. The conscious act of re-
fraining from action presupposes a wish to estab-
lish a mutually beneficial long-term relationship.
We derive a general principle for the forma-
tion process of a dyadic collaboration based on
the principle of congruity (Buckley, Cross and De
Mattos, 2015). According to the principle of con-
gruity, an individual is expected to agree with other
individuals holding similar views. This formula-
tion represents the change of attitude of one part-
ner (towards the other) as a function of the total
congruity of attitudes between partners towards
each other or objects under negotiation (CAtotal),
andmoderators of that intention (Mm). CAtotal de-
notes a tendency to follow the principle of con-
gruity. In other words, the higher the total con-
gruity of attitude between partners, the less likely
a change of attitude between partners (A1,2). In
turn, the lower the total congruity (or the higher
the incongruity) of attitudes towards the objects
under negotiation, the more likely is a change of
attitude between partners at a given time period
(i.e. from t = 0 to t = 1 in Equation (1)):
A1,2 = At=1,1,2 − At=0,1,2 = fa (CAtotal,Mm=1,r)
(1)
where
A1,2 = attitude change of P1 towards P2
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Figure 1. Attitude of P1 towards P2 does not change as P2 refrains from expressing an incongruent opinion regarding P1’s potential
contribution 1 (C1,1). (a) Initial setting (t = 0): attitude of P1 towards P2 is neutral; attitude of P1 towards C1,1 is positive; attitude of
P2 towards C1,1 is not disclosed. (b) Subsequent setting (t = 1): in the absence of an incongruent attitude, P1 assumes a positive attitude
of P2 towards C1,1 and the attitude of P1 towards P2 remains neutral as initially
At = 1,1,2 = attitude of P1 towards P2 at time
t = 1
At = 0,1,2 = attitude of P1 towards P2 at time
t = 0
fa = a function representing the congruity and
moderation effects
CAtotal = the cumulative congruity or incon-
gruity regarding the contributions of each partner.
Mm = 1, r refer to r moderator variables (i.e. m =
1,2,3, …, r) that will impact on the adaptation of
the congruity function, such as cultural differences
among parties, different mind-sets, different gen-
der perspectives, or their combined effects.9
CAtotal may be developed further as a function
of the overall congruence between the attitudes of
each partner regarding the contributions of each
partner (Ck and Ck′ , where k is the number of con-
tributions from P1 and k′ the number of contribu-
9Mm = 1,r may be represented by the sum of effects due to
the moderator-variable or rm = 1 Mm.
tions from P2):
CAtotal = g (CAC1, CAC2, . . . , CACk,
CAC1′, CAC2′, . . . , CACk′ ) (2)
where
g = a function representing the effects of the
parties’ congruity of attitude for each partner con-
tribution
CAC1, CAC2, …, CACk = the congruities be-
tween the partners regarding Ck contributions of
P1
CAC1’, CAC2’, …, CACk′ = the congruities be-
tween the partners regarding Ck′ contributions of
P2.
Mutual forbearance is a moderator countering
the effect of the principle of congruity where the
congruity effect would be non-trivial. In other
words, when the congruity between partners re-
garding the importance of partners’ contribution
is weak and therefore the tendency is towards less
agreement (or conflict) with the counterpart, for-
bearance may delay the negative action deriving
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Figure 2. Attitude of P1 towards P2 does not change as P1 refrains from following the principle of congruity, adjusting their attitude towards
P2 (following P2’s incongruent evaluation of C1,1). (a) Initial setting (t= 0): attitude of P1 towards P2 is neutral; attitude of P1 towards
C1,1 is positive; attitude of P2 towards C1,1 is negative. (b) Subsequent setting (t = 1): in the face of an incongruent attitude from P2, P1
refrains (forbears) from following the principle of congruity, thus adjusting their attitude towards P2, which remains neutral as initially
from the situation described. Mutual forbearance
is the combined effect of individual (or team) will-
ingness to forbear during interactions with each
other. This behaviour occurs in the formation of
airline networks (Star Alliance, Sky Team, One
World), when specific contributions frommember-
ship of the network may not be forthcoming in
the short term. However, airlines will delay a ra-
tional decision considering the short-term gains
due to the prospects of long-term benefits (Gomes-
Casseres, 1996). More specifically, mutual forbear-
ance within a dyadic alliance negotiation is defined
as a function of the combined effect of the individ-
ual forbearance of each partner at a specific point
in time (t):
MFbt = h (Ft,1,2, Ft,2,1) (3)
where
MFbt = mutual forbearance at time t
h = a function of the individual forbearance
demonstrated by each partner (to the other)
Ft,1,2 = forbearance of P1 towards P2 at time t
Ft,2,1 = forbearance of P2 towards P1 at time t.
Hence, assuming mutual forbearance to be a
moderator variable (i.e. M1), we have M1 =
MFbt = 1 (where MFbt = 1 represents mutual for-
bearance at time t = 1); the implicit assumption
here is that an event occurs in t = 0, which may
generate forbearance from either or both parties.
Equation (1) may be written as
A1,2 = At=1,1,2 − At=0,1,2
= fa (CAtotal,M1,Mm=2,r)
or
A1,2 = At=1,1,2 − At=0,1,2
= fa (CAtotal, MFbt=1, Mm=2,r)
or still
At=1,1,2 = At=0,1,2 + fa (CAtotal,MFbt=1, Mm=2,r)
(4)
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Further assume for simplicity that the combined
effect of moderators other than mutual forbear-
ance (MFbt = 1) leans towards 0, or Mm = 2, r ∼ 0.
Notwithstanding the change in attitude becomes
a function of total congruity and mutual forbear-
ance, and Equation (4) may be written as
At=1,1,2 = At=0,1,2 + fa (CAtotal,MFbt=1)
For simplicity, assume h is a linear function (see
Equation (3)), which leads to
MFbt=1 = Ft=1,1,2 + Ft=1,2,1










k CACk = the linear combination of the con-
gruity between partners regarding the Ck prospec-
tive contributions of P1
k′ CACk′ = the linear combination of the con-
gruity between partners regarding theCk′ prospec-
tive contributions of P2.
Furthermore, mutual forbearance would be ex-
pected to reverse the tendency postulated by the
congruity principle.
Thus, Equation (4) becomes










The attitude of P1 towards P2 at time t =
1 is dependent on a function (fa) of the linear
sum of congruity between the partners regarding
the contributions brought into the alliance on the
one hand, and the sum of the forbearance effects
demonstrated by each partner on the other hand.
If the parties do not forbear, the principle of con-
gruity holds. Thus, mutual forbearance is expected
to reverse or counterbalance the tendency postu-
lated by the congruity principle.
We have developed the concept of mutual
forbearance on the basis of an individual-to-
individual (or team-to-team) interactive process
to form a dyadic cooperative agreement, apply-
ing the principle of congruity reversed (Buckley,
Cross and De Mattos, 2015) and deriving a gen-
eral model demonstrating the attitude and be-
haviour of one party vis-à-vis another party and
their actions. This involves the potential contri-
butions of both parties and their evaluation of
those contributions.Mutual forbearance as amod-
erating factor counteracts the parties’ expected be-
haviour based on the principle of congruity. Next,
we model the crucial role of time.
The role of time
Consider two general actors in the economy, such
as senior managers (interacting actor 1 = IA1, in-
teracting actor 2 = IA2). We examine the actions
taking place between a point in time where mutual
forbearance intentions have yet not generated any
action and another point in time when mutual for-
bearance is agreed. Mutual forbearance comprises
basically two actions: one initial conditional for-
bearance act of A1 towards A2 (CF1,2) followed
by a counter conditional forbearance act from A2
towards A1 (CF2,1). Thus, we arrive at a modified
expression for Equation (3), which considers the
time between consecutive forbearance acts of the
interacting actors/prospective partners:
MFt,1,2 = f (CFt=0,1,2,CFt,2,1) (6)
where
MFt,1,2 = the mutual forbearance between A1
and A2 at time t, represented by function f
CFt = 0,1,2 = the initial conditional forbearance
act from A1, let’s say at time 0
CFt,2,1 = the counter conditional forbearance
act from A2 towards A1 at time t.
A conditional forbearance from A1 towards A2
(CF1,2) indicates that IA1 refrains from an act
detrimental to IA2 that would be expected, given
the circumstances (an action following the prin-
ciple of congruity) for a specified period of time
during which IA2 is expected to refrain from an-
other action that has been perceived just as detri-
mental to IA1. The effectiveness of the initial
conditional forbearance act in generating mutual
forbearance depends on the timing of the ensu-
ing conditional forbearance act (i.e. CFt,2,1) rela-
tive to the initial forbearance act (i.e. CFt = 0,1,2).
After refraining from an act potentially detrimen-
tal to IA2, IA1 will only wait for a reciprocal
and equivalent in(action) from IA2 up to a certain
point in time. The effectiveness of CFt = 0,1,2 and
CFt,2,1 in generating a mutual-forbearance act will
also depend on the congruity between the actors’
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evaluations of the worth equivalence of those con-
ditional forbearance acts (i.e. CFt = 0,1,2 ∼= CFt,2,1).
Drawing on the principle of congruity,
CFt = 0,1,2 will depend on the initial attitude
of IA1 towards IA2, the combined effect of the
congruence of evaluations of IA1 relative to
those of IA2 towards the items (or issues) under
negotiation, as well as a specified period of time
during which IA2 is expected to reciprocate such
(in)action.
Thus, we present the following function depict-
ing CFt = 0,1,2:
CFt=0,1,2 = f(A1,2,t=0; CAtotal;T1,2) (7)
where
A1,2.t = 0 = the attitude of A1 towards A2 at time
0
CAtotal = the combined effect of the congruence
of attitudes/evaluations of A1with those of A2 to-
wards each of n items (perceived to be) under ne-
gotiation (cf. Equation (2))
T1,2 = the time period that IA1 is willing to
forbear their (in)action while waiting for a recip-
rocal and equivalent forbearance (in)action from
IA2.
The ensuing conditional forbearance act from
IA2 in a similar manner depends on the initial at-
titude of IA2 towards IA1, the combined effect of
the congruence of attitudes/evaluations between
IA2 and IA1, and on IA2 discernment regarding
the equivalence of CFt ,2,1 apropos CFt = 0,1,2. It
may be written as
CFt,2,1 = f (At=0,2,1; CAtotal; DECf2,1; Cf1,2) (8)
where
At = 0,2,1 = the attitude of IA2 towards IA1 at
time 0
CAtotal = the combined effect of the congruence
of attitudes/evaluations of IA1 and IA2 towards
each of n items (believed to be) under negotiation
DECf2,1; Cf1,2 = the discernment of IA2 regard-
ing the equivalence of Cf2,1 apropos Cf1,2.
The terms regarding attitudes and congruency
are similar to those in the general model. There-
fore, the crucial constructs comprise the time
IA1 is willing to wait until IA2 reciprocates the
(in)action of IA1 (i.e. T1,2) and the discernment
of IA2 regarding the equivalence of CFt,2,1 apro-
pos CFt = 0,1,2 (i.e. DECf2,1; Cf1,2).
The latter term will be dependent on the per-
ceived potential gains of an (in)action (gains as-
sociated with a less aggressive positioning of the
competition in a particular market). It is a poten-
tially complex decision, and the lack of informa-
tion is likely to push it into the realm of intuitive
decision-making. It thus goes beyond the scope of
this paper.
We focus our attention on the former construct.
T1,2 is dependent on national, industry and cor-
porate cultures, as well as on the decision-maker’s
mind-set and previous experience. This effect could
be written as
T1,2 = g (cultural influences,mind
−set, experience) (9)
Thus, we propose a model that furthers our
understanding of the role of time in the micro-
mechanisms underlying mutual forbearance. We
also introduce the concept of conditional forbear-
ance as a micro-dynamic act within the process of
establishing amulti-forbearance agreement, conse-
quently highlighting the role of time in the process.
Application of the general model to
cross-cultural interactions
An important application of the general model
of mutual forbearance is cross-cultural business
interactions. National cultural differences in nego-
tiations across cultures may generate conflicts and
even insurmountable obstacles (Adler, Brahm and
Graham, 1992; Brett and Okumura, 1998; Chen,
Mannix and Okumura, 2003; Graham, 1985;
Graham, Evenko and Rajan, 1992; Lee, Shenkar
and Li, 2008; Liu, Chua and Stahl, 2010; Liu,
Friedman and Hong, 2012b). Graham, Evenko
and Rajan (1992) suggest that particular cultures
may favour specific negotiation styles. This may
be linked to both the direct effects of a particular
cultural environment (absolute viewpoint) or to
the result of one culture interacting with another
(relative viewpoint) (Shenkar, Luo and Yeheskel,
2008). Cultural friction between interacting firms
during negotiation refers to a number of dimen-
sions that would otherwise lead to a positive
atmosphere, such as effective communication and
trust-building. This highlights the differences or
relative importance of the individuals in
such a process and its implications, including
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trust-building (Abramson et al., 1993; Adler,
Doktor and Redding, 1986; Lander and Kooning,
2013; Malhotra, 2013; Redding, 1980).
Some cultures value relationship aspects differ-
ently (Chung, Sternquist and Chen, 2006) – often
an outcome of face-to-face interaction. Cultural
effects will be stronger at the start of personal in-
teraction (Marshall and Boush, 2001) rather than
when time has allowed for cultural change in the
individuals involved or in their preferred behaviour
(Molinsky, 2007; Tinsley, 1998; Tinsley and Pil-
lutla, 1998).
When a negotiator from a particular cultural
background has a higher propensity to avoid con-
flict than a negotiator from a different cultural
background, it is logical that one of the mecha-
nisms they will employ in conducting a negotiation
is forbearance. Acts of mutual forbearance may
counter negative effects of the principle of con-
gruity in the short term (aiming at better prospects
in the long term). This parallels acts of selfless
generosity, or giving without expecting anything in
return.
Temporal perceptions of individuals vary across
cultures (Mosakowski and Earley, 2000). To il-
lustrate a situation where individuals with differ-
ent culturally embedded forbearance approaches
interact, we could examine the ‘collective ver-
sus individual’ dimension of culture (Hofstede,
1980). An individual from a collective culture is
likely to have had several opportunities in which
forbearance was employed in order to follow a
less conflicting interaction path, and thereby en-
sure group harmony and support the mainte-
nance of collective objectives vis-à-vis individ-
ual objectives (Delerue and Simon, 2009). We ar-
gue that this common in-group practice of for-
bearance may foster its use in interactions with
out-group individuals. It is reasonable to assume
that members of collectivist cultures will demon-
strate higher forbearance to out-group individu-
als than members of individualist cultures. There-
fore, mutual forbearance, which comprises the ef-
fects of each party’s forbearance approach, is a
function of national cultural influences on the
individual.
Using the development regarding the role of
time in the formation of mutual forbearance
(Equation (7)), considering the impact of cultural
influences on T1,2 (Equation (9)) and disregard-
ing for simplification the effects of mind-set and
experience (i.e. mind-set effect ∼= 0; experience ef-
fect ∼= 0), we have
T1,2 = g (Mc,1)
where
Mc,1 = the cultural influences (e.g. cultural back-
ground) of IA1
and therefore
CFt=0,1,2 = f (At=0,1,2;CAtotal; g (Mc,1)) (10)
Thus, we arrive at the following proposition:
P1: The effectiveness of an act of mutual forbear-
ance will differ for actors of different cultural
backgrounds because of their culturally depen-
dent expectation regarding the speed of reaching
congruity (or the time the first actor will allow for
the consecutive forbearance act to appear).
Effectiveness in the context of mutual forbear-
ance is the likelihood of reaching the end of a
mutual-forbearance process.
We expect that the equivalence of two condi-
tional forbearance acts is culturally dependent,
particularly if the evaluation of the actions in-
volves abstract and complex estimates (estimates
based on expectations regarding future scenarios).
Some cultures favour long-term whereas others
favour short-term orientations in their decision-
making (Minkov and Hofstede, 2012). A short-
term orientation may influence negatively (lower)
the evaluation of a current action vis-à-vis the re-
wards the same action could potentially bring in
the long term. If we consider a developing coun-
try scenario where uncertainty and unreliable in-
formation are rife, this effect may be multiplied
(as even a manager of a long-term culture will
be tempted to consider relatively more short-term
strategies due to the unpredictable environment).
Using the development regarding the discern-
ment of the equivalence of conditional forbear-
ance acts in the formation of mutual forbearance
(Equation (8)), and considering the impact of cul-
tural influences on DECf2,1; Cf1,2, we have
DECf2,1;Cf1,2 = r (Mc,2)
where
Mc,2 = the cultural influences (e.g. cultural back-
ground) of IA2
and therefore
CFt,2,1 = f (At=0,2,1;CAtotal; r (Mc,2)) (11)
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Thus, we arrive at the following proposition:
P2: The effectiveness of an act of mutual forbear-
ance will differ for actors of different cultural
backgrounds because of their culturally depen-
dent discernment regarding the equivalence of
conditional mutual-forbearance acts.
Previously, we attempted to isolate the effect of
mutual forbearance by considering the assump-
tion that the effect of other moderators tends to
zero. However, we observe that culture (as a poten-
tial moderator) may indirectly affect mutual for-
bearance, as indicated above. Our assumption may
be easier to support if we consider that the ten-
dency to forbear, or refrain from taking a (nega-
tive) action, may already incorporate the effects of
other moderators such as culture. Mutual forbear-
ance during the negotiation may be determined
not only in absolute terms by the national cultural
influences of each interacting negotiator (or the
national culture of each party if we consider the
negotiators of each party as belonging to one cul-
ture), but also in relative terms by the cultural dis-
tance and friction between the parties (Shenkar,
Luo and Yeheskel, 2008). Mutual forbearance (as
well as forbearance) may be seen as representing
a visible action determined in part by cultural ef-
fects on both relative and absolute viewpoints, and
hence, as an outcome of the effects of culture on
negotiations.
Conclusion
The understanding of mutual forbearance, com-
bined with the principle of congruity, is key to
building a process model of alliance creation and
operation. The contribution of this paper is to
draw together these two principles from different
disciplines – the principle of congruity (social psy-
chology) and mutual forbearance (international
business/economics) – to examine the micro-
mechanisms of the mutual-forbearance formation
process as a strategy that may lead to coopera-
tion. First, we looked at the role of the individ-
ual in individual-to-individual or team-to-team
micro-mechanisms associated with the mutual-
forbearance formation process. Second, we pre-
sented a theory on the role of time on individual
actions in the mutual-forbearance formation pro-
cess. Our novel perspective that considers time and
individual-level interactions viewed through the
principle of congruity allows executives/managers’
intentions and actions to be understood in the
light of moderating factors such as experienced
cultural influences and mind-set influences.
Considering the role of time in the dynamic
process of individuals’ actions and reactions lead-
ing to the setting up of a mutual-forbearance
agreement should lead to an increase in the
number and longevity of such international inter-
organizational business agreements. A better
understanding of the dynamic micro-process
caused by and generating interactions between
individuals (decision-makers) and the role of
time in the context of establishing a mutual-
forbearance agreement should decrease conflict
situations, increasing the likelihood of form-
ing business collaborations. Our individual-level
model suggests that decisions in the context of es-
tablishing a mutual-forbearance deal are affected
by individual-level micro-decisions that may not
be explicitly expressed nor rationally considered
as part of the process.
Based on social psychology, we employ the prin-
ciple of congruity as the basis for furthering our
understanding of this ‘mental process’. Our model
opens up a ‘black-box’ – that is, the implicit pro-
cesses leading to explicit decision-making in the
context of mutual forbearance. The role of time is
an essential component of this process. Timing of
actions and reactions in the context of a sequence
of interactions between decision-makers involved
in establishing a mutual-forbearance agreement –
or the time allowed for the counterparty to re-
spond or act – may be seen as promoting or de-
fusing conflict situations, hence promoting har-
monious interaction. We focus on the effect of
implicit messages using tactical actions and re-
actions as equivalent to a sign language em-
ployed in the context of market interactions. We
highlight the importance of the interpretation
of such signs as well as timing considerations,
taking into account specific conditions of each
agent’s context and their effect on this dynamic
process.
The key to successful alliance creation and op-
eration is to embed a flexible governance structure
that builds confidence and allows continual and
continued investment by all parties in the alliance.
The concept of mutual forbearance and the con-
gruity of actions with all parties’ frame of refer-
ence are the underlying factors that explain this
process.
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This study has limitations that provide ideas for
further research. Firstly, we look at the theoretical
extension regarding the moderation of behaviour
predicted by the principle of congruity. In this pa-
per, we have indicated possible moderators, such
as the cultural influences experienced by senior
managers of multinational corporations, or their
mind-set/expectations, which are usually linked to
current or former business procedures in the busi-
ness environment of the countries they are origi-
nally from (e.g. legal formalities, informal business
procedures, dubious practices not accepted else-
where). The process of mutual forbearance could
be influenced by other factors besides culture or
cultural clusters. For instance, stereotypical views
regardingmanagers/firms from developing nations
versus those of developed nations. Individual cir-
cumstances outside cultural constraints, such as:
(1) individual reactions based on personal past
experiences leading to unfounded generalizations;
(2) general confidence and past experience with
cross-cultural interactions; or (3) the comparative
bargaining power of firms (possibly extended to
their senior managers) due to size, in-house ex-
pertise, exclusive access to valuable resources or
knowledge.
Locational factors, such as the strategic impor-
tance of a particular location to the firm, could
be influential (Dunning, 2009). Other moderators
could independently have an effect on the tim-
ing of the actions regarding the development of
mutual forbearance. Moreover, these moderators
could have a double effect – one on the poten-
tial to allow for trust, and the second impacting
on the development of mutual forbearance. We
illustrated the possible effects of cultural back-
ground on mutual forbearance using Hofstede’s
‘collective versus individual’ cultural dimension.
Other dimensions of culture could have a differ-
ent effect, to be investigated further. Compara-
tive studies of firms from different countries would
add to our understanding of how culture impacts
on mutual forbearance and collaboration forma-
tion. Investigations as to how mutual forbearance
may be used in the context and particular con-
ditions of small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
are also of great interest. Further, the relation-
ship between the repeated use of mutual forbear-
ance and the accomplishment of additional coop-
erative ventures merits further attention. For in-
stance, the impact of perceptions brought about by
specialized social media websites (e.g. LinkedIn)
formed prior to (or at the start of) the option to
engage in mutual forbearance. We examine, for
example, the history of alliances (both success-
ful and unsuccessful) under the leadership of a
particular senior manager. The effectiveness of
mutual-forbearance micro-mechanisms under dif-
ferent conditions might be explored further. For
instance, considering a potential dyadic alliance,
what level of uncertainty is associated with specific
partners’ contributions and how effective can mu-
tual forbearance be in mitigating those various sit-
uations? Our paper proposes a conceptual model
that should lead to attempts to empirically verify
its functioning and its validity, carried out through
data simulations.
By adopting the predictions suggested by our
model, managers are better able to prepare or
develop appropriate skills. The increased under-
standing provided by our model supports a con-
tained and reflective attitude from managers in
such contexts. It should inform/equip managers
to undertake more effective preparation prior
to establishing mutual-forbearance agreements.
By positively influencing managerial expectations
(Malhotra andGino, 2011) and establishing a pos-
itive atmosphere, the likelihood of success will in-
crease (Jap, Robertson and Hamilton, 2011). In
other words, managers should employ a rational
search for alternatives and give appropriate con-
sideration to circumstantial influences such as na-
tional culture and mind-set.
This approach is equivalent to choosing (or ab-
dicating) the required message to establish a pos-
itive atmosphere (Chung, Sternquist and Chen,
2006; Srivastava and Chakravarti, 2009) consider-
ing tactical (market) actions instead of messages.
Although we have focused on market tactical ac-
tions, we could also consider a broader range of
actions that might generate congruous (positive)
or incongruous (negative) outcomes.
It should also be possible to identify a priori
potential areas of conflict, whose likelihood can
be minimized, as well as areas of harmony, whose
likelihood should be maximized.
Although we assume a situation where direct
contact does not take place, an atmosphere of
implicit trust is developed over time. During this
time, the higher the congruity of objectives that
is implicit in sequences of actions and reactions,
the higher the likelihood of those actions and re-
actions developing trust. Trust-building therefore
may be reinforced through both bilateral (Kim,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
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Dirks and Cooper, 2009) and unilateral initiatives.
This argument draws on literature that emphasizes
the importance of communication between parties
(Liu, Chua and Stahl, 2010; Mohr and Spekman,
1994). Our contribution is that in the situation we
portray, there is no direct communication between
the parties, only indirect communication through
market signals. Despite this, conducting such an
interactive process in a clear and effective manner
remains important.
Policy-makers should have a clear understand-
ing of the processes through which business deals
are formed in order to effectively and positively
carry out market interventions. Although the use
of mutual-forbearance understandings has mostly
been restricted to large corporations, SMEs may
also benefit from such agreements. Born-global
SMEs (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004; Knight and Li-
esch, 2016; Zander, McDougall-Covin and Rose,
2015) targeting nichemarkets are examples of such
propitious conditions.
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